FP Analytics

Pulling Sideways

How Indo-Pacific Middle Powers are Responding to Great-Power Competition Across Security, Economic, and Energy Sectors

A Power Map by FP Analytics

The 40 nations of the Indo-Pacific are home to about two-thirds of the world’s population, will represent half of the world’s GDP by 2040, and are responsible for half of global carbon emissions. A third of global trade transits through the Strait of Malacca and 80 percent of global maritime oil trade traverses the Indian Ocean. Understanding this growing and vibrant region is essential to addressing a wide range of global issues, from global supply chains and shipping chokepoints to the sourcing of minerals that are critical to national defense and clean energy transition. In recent years, the Indo-Pacific has become a battleground of competing Chinese and American interests—but how have countries across the region responded to this competition? What are the future implications for industry and trade, regional stability, climate action, and international security?

.


key takeaways

  • With geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between the United States and China intensifying, most Indo-Pacific nations are strategically hedging their bets through a dynamic set of trade agreements and security partnerships with both great powers rather than singularly aligning with Washington or Beijing. 
  • Billions of dollars in trade and investments from the United States and China are flowing into Indo-Pacific economies, especially in the technology and green energy sectors, to drive industrial growth and sustainable development.
  • Indo-Pacific middle powers have also developed a multitude of mini-lateral cooperative agreements with each other and with countries from other regions that, taken together, form a complex web of intersecting relationships.
  • As leaders across sectors seek to engage in business and diplomacy, strengthen supply chains, and foster growth and security in the region, this Power Map serves as an informative and insightful resource to more clearly understand how Indo-Pacific nations are leveraging great power competition and the evolving risks and opportunities these shifting dynamics present.

This Power Map examines how middle powers in the Indo-Pacific perceive and pursue their national interests in the face of competitive pressures from the United States and China. It identifies overlapping security, economic, and environmental trends that collectively depict a region too complex, resilient, and independent to coalesce behind either American or Chinese leadership. Rather, the region’s overarching response to great-power competition has been cooperative non-alignment, resisting both Chinese and American aspirations for regional dominance through dynamic security and economic partnerships.

As explored here, cooperative non-alignment presents both challenges and opportunities for investments and engagement in the region. Government and business leaders alike need to take stock of evolving geopolitical and geoeconomic trends in order to build resilient supply chains, expand market share, bolster security arrangements, mitigate risk exposure, and ensure environmental stewardship. A firm grasp on the set of eight key trends showcased in this Power Map can better equip decisionmakers to navigate a vibrant yet volatile landscape.

PART 1 | Security

An assertive China has motivated some Indo-Pacific nations to increase defense spending and forge new security agreements with the West and one another.

Over the past decade, China has increasingly asserted its interests in the South China Sea. President Xi Jinping has enforced the country’s expansive “nine-dash line” claims and constructed islands, barriers, airstrips, and military installations in contested waters. Xi’s tenure has also coincided with an uptick in Chinese military exercises and incursions into Taiwanese airspace and cyberspace. Such operations have fueled concerns about a potential military conflict over the island among China, Taiwan, and the United States, which has taken a strong interest in preserving Taiwanese autonomy.

Since 2017, these developments have contributed to a pronounced rise in unfavorable views of China among several nations across the region. A 2023 survey of 1,308 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political elites found that, if forced to choose between aligning with China and the United States, majorities in seven out of 10 countries would pick the latter. Moreover, the majority of respondents in every country but Brunei expressed concern over China’s rising influence across the region.

FIGURE 1

Popular Opinion of China Over Time in Select Indo-Pacific Nations

As of late 2023, respondents in Southeast Asia increasingly preferred siding with the United States if forced to choose.

Data note: Respondents were asked, “If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals, which one should it choose?” The number of survey respondents were 1,994 (2024), 1,308 (2023), 1,677 (2022), 1,032 (2021), and 1,308 (2020). The year 2020 report had a different method of calculating ASEAN averages.

Source: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Desire to guard against China’s territorial ambitions has motivated some of these nations—especially Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia, historically U.S. allies—to step up their defense investments and forge new security agreements with the West. This trend has been most pronounced in Japan, pivoting away from its longstanding pacifistic foreign policy. Japan recently finalized the largest upgrade to the U.S.-Japan security pact in 60 years and has pledged to raise its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027 from 1.6 percent (USD 56.7 billion) in 2024, indicating a more pronounced military posture in the region.  

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia has also increased its cooperation through high-profile military exercises in recent years, while India’s relations with China have grown frosty following violent border disputes. Australia entered AUKUS—a trilateral security partnership with the United States and United Kingdom through which Australia will ultimately acquire nuclear powered submarines—in 2021, and the trio is now considering adding Japan to its fold. Australia is also set to increase its defense spending from 2 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP by 2034. Australia and New Zealand continue to coordinate with the United States in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which has grown from Cold War roots into a robust Anglosphere surveillance apparatus. Auckland is also drifting closer to the United States following China’s widespread interference in New Zealand’s 2017 national elections.

In response to China’s assertiveness and to deteriorating relations with North Korea following the latter’s escalating missile and nuclear weapons tests, South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has centered his country’s national security around tighter U.S. security collaboration, including by authorizing the full deployment of American THAAD missile systems on the peninsula. The Philippines has also pivoted toward the United States since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was elected in 2022, while non-treaty allies like Indonesia and Vietnam have stepped up security cooperation with the United States, including through Super Garuda Shield military exercises involving amphibious, airborne, and live-fire field operations. In concert, these dynamic partnerships reflect growing dissatisfaction with China’s activities in the region and a willingness to work with the United States where security interests overlap.

FIGURE 2

U.S. Military Footprint in the Indo-Pacific

Four Indo-Pacific locations host more than 1,000 U.S. military troops.

Sources: Globalaffairs.org, Todaysmilitary.com, Al Jazeera, World Population Review

Hedging between the U.S. and China allows Indo-Pacific nations to avoid entangling obligations and to solicit security investments and overtures from both sides.

Nevertheless, despite their desire to counter China’s regional domination, Indo-Pacific nations are not simply deferring to American leadership. Memories of colonization reinforce the region’s desire for autonomy and aversion to dependence on foreign powers. The recent violence in Gaza has severely damaged the United States’ reputation in Muslim-majority nations in the Indo-Pacific, increasing the political risk to leaders of siding with the United States. Moreover, few nations wish to forgo the economic benefits of continued Chinese ties, which have long been essential to the region’s growth.

These competing incentives produce a delicate balancing act exemplified by Vietnam’s strategy of “bamboo diplomacy.” Named after the tree with “firm roots” and “flexible branches,” the policy adopted by the government prioritizes adaptable strategies in pursuit of steady objectives. In recent years, Vietnam has upgraded its defense pacts with both the United States and China. Similarly, national militaries across the region are diversifying their defense procurement, often buying from both China and India to reduce dependency on any single supplier. Indonesia has shown more solidarity with the global south than with either China or the United States, consistent with its historical support for a non-aligned foreign policy. And ASEAN’s struggles to respond in unison to the 2021 coup in Myanmar, or to China’s posturing and maneuvers in the South China Sea, reveal limits to Southeast Asian nations’ ability to cohesively push back on Chinese security interests. By not confronting China too forcefully, states in the region can continue to court investments from both major powers.

Mini-lateral security partnerships allow Indo-Pacific nations to advance their interests while retaining independence.

This hedging strategy has accelerated a trend away from grand hemispheric alliances toward a web of narrower, ad hoc security partnerships. In just the last few years, Japan has formed bilateral security agreements with the Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and trilateral agreements with the United States and the Philippines, and the United Kingdom and Italy. Likewise, the Philippines has signed bilateral agreements with not only Japan but also Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. These arrangements involve a wide range of limited but overlapping national security objectives, such as stationing troops abroad, reciprocal access agreements, joint air or naval patrols, coastguard cooperation, missile warning systems, and the sale of ships or warplanes. Similarly, India’s 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, originally held in 2018 with the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, have expanded to meetings with equivalent officials in Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The expanded meetings demonstrate not only India’s dynamic willingness to engage U.S. adversaries like Russia, but also its preference to address security issues bilaterally, mirroring regional trends.

FIGURE 3

Assortment of Security Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific nations have forged a complex web of multinational organizations and agreements focused on security issues.

Hover over each country for more information

In characterizing these developments, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed in 2023 that Washington was “piecing together small blocs through its alliance system” to “create division in the region, stoke confrontation and undermine peace.” Yet, China has long established bilateral defense ties of its own, including a mutual defense treaty with North Korea that it renewed in 2021. Beijing has politically and materially supported the military junta controlling Myanmar since the 2021 coup, and recently reached a security agreement with the Maldives as well, creating strategic access for Beijing to the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Since 2017, China has held high-level security meetings and military exercises with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In these ways, both the United States and China are leveraging mini-lateral agreements to further their security interests.

This evolving web of security partnerships emerges partly from disillusionment with seemingly gridlocked or dysfunctional multilateral institutions and their failure to adequately address a growing list of non-traditional security challenges affecting the region. These challenges include pandemics, piracy, counterterrorism, climate change, natural disasters, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and human smuggling. From the perspective of many Indo-Pacific nations, these challenges demand more regional collaboration than great-power competition, and mini-lateral regional partnerships are proving a flexible and attractive way to collaborate.

PART 2 | ECONOMICS

Indo-Pacific countries are establishing separate trade partnerships with both the U.S. and China, mirroring security trends toward regional or bilateral partnerships.

Amid intensifying competition between the U.S. and China, widespread disenchantment with global trade rules, and ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, supply chains in the Indo-Pacific are also shifting toward regional, bilateral, and mini-lateral trade relationships. Production networks are rerouted to like-minded countries (friend-shoring), countries closer to the importing country (near-shoring), or back to the home country itself (re-shoring).

As part of its strategy to build economic ties with Indo-Pacific countries, China is currently negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with Sri Lanka and a combined FTA with Japan and South Korea, as well as the expansion of existing FTAs with ASEAN and South Korea. Feasibility studies are underway for potentially five other bilateral FTAs in the region, in addition to those already existing among China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the members of ASEAN. These agreements constitute a concerted effort by Beijing to diversify its export markets in the face of American divestment, as China’s share of U.S. imports declined by 8 percentage points from 21.6 percent in 2017 to 13.9 percent in 2023. In 2023, monthly shipments from China to ASEAN member states reached a value of almost USD 600 billion per month, placing ASEAN ahead of the United States and European Union on the list of China’s largest export partners.

FIGURE 4

Assortment of Economic Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific nations are engaged in a multitude of bilateral and mini-lateral economic partnerships.

Hover over each country for more information

Data note: For the Belt and Road Initiative, the authors only included those countries listed as East Asia and the Pacific, following the Green Finance and Development Center classification. Around 150 countries have signed a Belt and Road MOU with China.

By contrast, the United States has only three FTAs in the region, with Singapore, South Korea, and Australia. Washington aims to deepen trade engagements in the region through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), as well as through limited agreements on trade in critical minerals with Australia, Japan, and South Korea via the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). Moreover, in 2022 the U.S. and ASEAN members forged a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), strengthening engagements in health, climate and environment, energy, transportation, gender, and defense. These partnerships are critical to strengthening American industries such as emerging technologies, defense, and renewable energy, and in doing so, the U.S.’ strategic competition with China.

However, there are also inefficiencies emerging in the reshaping of global trade. The souring of trade relations between the United States and China has rerouted trade flows through “connector” countries, which essentially import from China and export to the United States to circumvent trade restrictions. Though this practice is inefficient for the global economy, it creates advantageous arbitrage opportunities for middle powers in the Indo-Pacific. Countries such as Vietnam, for instance, have recorded gains in both U.S. import shares and Chinese export shares, a strategy that could be replicated by other countries in the Indo-Pacific.  

FIGURE 5

Semiconductor Trade in the Indo-Pacific, 2019–2023

Alongside high-income economies, emerging economies are expanding their trade with both great powers.

Between 2019 and 2023, Indo-Pacific countries increased their imports from China by 5.5 percent and exports to the U.S. by 8.3 percent in semiconductor and integrated circuit products, indicating a growing role as “connector” countries between the two great powers. Trade value is in thousand USD.

SEMICONDUCTORS AND INTEGRATED CIRCUITS EXPORTS

SEMICONDUCTORS AND INTEGRATED CIRCUITS IMPORTS

Data note: Trade value is in thousand USD. The UN Comtrade data includes re-exports and re-imports data. Hong Kong re-exports about 60 percent of China-origin products to other locations (censtatd.gov.hk). Semiconductors and integrated circuits are listed under HS Code 8541 and 8542 in UN Comtrade.

Sources: UN Comtrade, Taiwan Customs Adminstration

Indo-Pacific countries solicit investments from both the U.S. and China, especially in the tech industry, to advance their national industrial policies and sustainable development goals.

Industrial policies, which seek to develop targeted industries, have been on the rise globally, and almost half (48 percent) of new industrial policy measures in 2023 came from China, the United States, and the European Union. As great powers try to outpace each other technologically, Indo-Pacific countries seek to take advantage of this competition. In 2023, the sectors that received the most investments globally—such as grants and subsidies, tax credits, and capital investments—were in technologies, particularly military and civilian dual-use technologies (25.7 percent), low carbon technologies (15.3 percent), and advanced technologies such as semiconductors (20.6 percent). 

FIGURE 6

Tracking New Industrial Policies Globally

Indo-Pacific countries are navigating a global economic terrain increasingly influenced by state interventions over the past decade.

Data note: The authors used the number of ‘distortive’ industrial policies data to disaggregate by region, motivation, instrument, and products. Distortive measures limit the market access of foreign businesses or modify conditions to favor local firms. Liberalizing measures increase market access on a non-discriminatory basis or enhance the transparency of a relevant policy. Data includes state interventions affecting trade in goods and services, foreign investment, and labor-force migration (Evenett, S. et al., 2024).

Sources: Global Trade Alert; Evenett, S. et al., 2024

Several nations, especially emerging economies, have negotiated investment deals with both the Americans and the Chinese. Vietnam remains China’s top trading partner among ASEAN nations, but it has also recently become a top exporter of advanced technology products to the United States. The United States is channeling investments into Vietnam’s semiconductor system as part of the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund of the CHIPS Act. Malaysia has also partnered with both United States and China to develop its semiconductor and electric vehicle industries. South Korean tech-giant Samsung is set to receive USD 6 billion in grants from the CHIPS Act to build semiconductor-processing plants in the U.S., as South Korea aims to enhance supply chain cooperation with China. For middle powers in the region, these partnerships advance national industrial policy goals through external investments by the U.S. and China in emerging technologies.

FIGURE 7

Key U.S. and China Investments in the Indo-Pacific, 2023

Southeast Asian countries were big recipients of investments in the tech and energy sectors.

ENERGY INVESTMENTS

$675,000,000

United States: Investment firm KKR is investing in Serentica Renewables, an Indian decarbonization platform. The U.S. DFC is providing a loan to India’s TP Solar Limited to finance the construction and operation of a solar manufacturing facility in India.

$1,320,000,000

China: Chinese companies are primarily investing in Southeast Asian countries. Ningbo Boway and Trina Solar are investing in Vietnam’s solar manufacturing facilities, Zanyu Technology is investing in biodiesel in Malaysia, and Yunnan Energy is investing in Laos’ energy infrastructure.

TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

$1,065,000,000

United States: Investments by KKR in Optic Marine Services, an offshore telecom infrastructure services provider in the Asia Pacific, and in Singtel, a data center operator in Singapore.

$2,330,000,000

China: In 2023, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam received tech investments from Chinese companies. Among the largest investments was in South Korea, where the Chinese company Hefei Xinmei Materials is acquiring LG Chem, a company that makes optical filters for electronic devices.

Sources: Whitehouse.gov; U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker; Yicai Global; Laotian Times; Trina Solar; Reuters

Meanwhile, services sectors are increasingly seen as viable alternative sources of economic development in lieu of manufacturing, recognizing that reliance on industrial investments alone may be insufficient in a shape-shifting global economy. Countries like India and the Philippines have growing services sectors, where a high share of ICT services relative to total exports has fueled economic growth over the past years. For emerging economies in the region, fresh economic policies that seize multiple sources of development are needed to achieve economic resilience in a turbulent world, made complex by the intensifying great-power competition between the U.S. and China.

PART 3 | Energy & ENVIRONMENT

Indo-Pacific countries are soliciting green investments in clean energy and infrastructure from the U.S. and China to advance their climate and development objectives.

The global push for clean energy transition and decarbonization pledges around the world is driving up demand for lithium, cobalt, nickel, and other rare-earth elements—necessary components in clean energy technologies such as electric vehicle (EV) batteries. This increased demand provides development opportunities for Indo-Pacific countries, which can supply many of these critical minerals. In turn, Indo-Pacific countries leverage access to international markets to build their domestic clean energy industry. At the same time, most of the Indo-Pacific countries aim for 2050 net-zero goals of their own. Meeting these targets warrants large-scale deployment of clean energy technologies and infrastructure. Clean energy transition is capital-intensive and would require substantial foreign investments and technical assistance from countries like the U.S. and China.

FIGURE 8

Electric Battery Trade in the Indo-Pacific, 2019–2023

Indo-Pacific economies are increasing their electric battery trade, but new U.S. tariffs aimed at reducing imports from China could alter regional trade dynamics.

Between 2019 and 2023, China maintained dominance in the electric battery industry, with a fourfold increase in exports to Indo-Pacific countries. Meanwhile, the U.S. is catching up, with rising exports (up by 32 percent) and imports (up by 21.5 percent) of electric batteries to and from Indo-Pacific countries. Trade value is in thousand USD.

ELECTRIC BATTERIES EXPORTS

>

ELECTRIC BATTERIES IMPORTS

Data note: Trade value is in thousand USD. The UN Comtrade data includes re-exports and re-imports data. Hong Kong re-exports about 60 percent of China-origin products to other locations (censtatd.gov.hk). Electric batteries, including lithium-ion batteries, are listed under HS Code 8507 in UN Comtrade.

Sources: UN Comtrade, Taiwan Customs Adminstration

China marked the 10-year anniversary of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2023 by reiterating its commitment to green development, increasing investments in low-carbon energy and forgoing new international coal plant projects. China dominates the region’s critical minerals market as their top supplier and is increasing its investments in the mining and metals sector across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, the United States aims to dampen China’s critical minerals dominance by capturing a greater share of the market, including through bilateral agreements and economic and climate frameworks in the region. A 2023 agreement between the United States and Japan builds on a 2019 trade agreement between the two countries to remove trade barriers and foster collaboration on critical minerals supply chains, especially for the rare earth elements needed to make EV batteries. The 2023 Australia-U.S. Climate, Critical Minerals, and Clean Energy Transformation Compact also promotes clean energy and critical minerals supply chains.

FIGURE 9

Top Critical Minerals Mining and Refining Countries, 2023–2040

The top three countries’ market shares are projected to increase through 2040, with Indonesia emerging as a heavyweight in nickel supply.

Source: IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024

Moreover, countries in the Indo-Pacific are lining up to take advantage of EV tax credits in the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia are calling on U.S. trade officials to integrate critical minerals deals into the IPEF to reduce barriers to their minerals exports. Since the IPEF is not a traditional free trade agreement, including reduced barriers to critical minerals trade would mean that countries would not need separate agreements like the one signed between the United States and Japan. This arrangement, if ironed out, could be a boon for the green energy industry, increasing access to raw materials and diversifying supply chains, which can enhance the industry’s economic resilience and accelerate the achievement of renewable energy targets.

Clean energy security in Vietnam

+

For Vietnam, investments from the United States and China help grow its economy and diversify its energy sources to shore up domestic energy security. Without outside help, Vietnam could fall short in reaching its climate goals, since it needs to fill a USD 135 billion gap for energy infrastructure projects in order to meet its decarbonization targets by 2030. In 2023, the United States announced that its relations with Vietnam would be raised to a comprehensive strategic partnership, promoting diplomatic and economic cooperation, including building resilience in semiconductor supply chains. As part of this initiative, the United States is set to invest USD 8 billion in Vietnam for semiconductor manufacturing and green energy development. In addition, in 2022, Vietnam entered into the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP) coalition, which includes the United States, to add an initial USD 15.5 billion of foreign direct investment to its energy transition efforts. However, China is also aiding Vietnam in its march toward a 2050 net zero goal. In 2024, Chinese firm Hainan Drinda New Energy announced a USD 450 million solar panel production project in Vietnam, adding to the nearly USD 4 billion worth of Chinese investments in Vietnam in 2023.

Clean energy security in Indonesia

+

Indonesia’s critical mineral reserves have become key to attracting both Chinese and American investments. The country aims to enhance its decarbonization capabilities and infrastructure by courting Chinese investment through the BRI while also signing a USD 20 billion JETP deal with the U.S. and its allies. Indonesia seeks to use JETP investments to achieve net-zero emissions in its power sector by 2050. However, Indonesia may face difficulties in courting further investments due to its 2020 export ban on raw nickel, prompted by Indonesia’s goal of developing its own nickel-processing industry. Nickel is used in electric vehicle batteries and in renewable energy storage systems, and therefore it is crucial for meeting global and national clean energy goals.

Clean energy security in the Philippines

+

The Philippines aims to attract investments in domestic mineral processing. Unlike Indonesia, the country does not have a ban on raw mineral exports, and much of its raw nickel is exported to China. However, the Philippines is increasingly wary of Chinese direct investment in critical economic sectors due to rising geopolitical tensions between the two countries. Manila has shown a willingness to let the United States directly invest in its downstream economic sectors, including a recently announced USD 1 billion infusion to develop power and refueling stations. The country hopes this investment will help it meet its goals to boost its renewable energy share from 32 percent as of 2024 to 35 percent by 2030, and 50 percent by 2040. Moreover, the United States and the Philippines are seeking to jumpstart nuclear energy projects in the country in order to meet growing electricity demand there, while aligning with decarbonization goals.

Great power tensions have resulted in economic uncertainties and a web of complex regulations and agreements, motivating the region’s economies to seek ways to cooperate outside the U.S.-China orbit.

The intensifying trade war between the U.S. and China has challenged Indo-Pacific countries as they attempt to navigate increasingly complex trade rules. For example, Jakarta seeks a deal with Washington to ensure that Indonesia’s critical minerals can be exported to the United States under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). However, Indonesia has used Chinese investments to develop its nickel-refining capabilities, and its questionable labor and human rights practices in the mining industry are at odds with the IRA’s framework. These issues present obstacles to a free-trade deal on “EV minerals” with the United States.

FIGURE 10

Non-Aligned Security and Economic Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

Several security and economic blocs in the region involve neither the United States nor China.

Hover over each country for more information

Vietnam is looking to Japan to help meet its infrastructure needs while reducing its reliance on the United States or China, reiterating the trend in the region of diversified partnerships. More advanced economies are leveraging their comparative advantages across industries to work around China and the United States. For example, Japan recently announced USD 75 billion in new economic and infrastructure assistance programs in the region and in the Global South. At the 2023 ASEAN-India summit, India proposed a 12-point partnership agenda aiming to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in digital and health care industries. South Korea and India seek to expand partnerships in areas such as emerging technologies, green hydrogen, and nuclear, among others. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—a growing trade agreement among 11 nations but excluding the United States and China—is a pioneer in crafting extensive rules for ecommerce trade and is another example of regional collaboration to suit shared interests without involving great powers.

PART 4 | GLOBAL STAKES

Trends in the Indo-Pacific have profound implications for global security, economic stability, business strategy, climate action, and other global public goods.

The rise of mini-lateral security agreements and reshaping of global trade present new uncertainties, challenges, and opportunities for a wide range of actors. At the national level, Indo-Pacific countries must craft strategies that prevent them from being marginalized by geopolitical rifts while at the same time tapping the opportunities arising from great-power competition. Middle powers may find their hedging abilities stretched to the limit as pressure from the U.S. and China inhibits consensus on various transboundary issues. As a result, great powers’ ability to court allies and advance their interests in the region will depend on their ability to customize trade and security arrangements to each partner nation’s individual interests, while avoiding the risk of escalating competition into overt military conflict.

Economically, the splintering of multilateral trade, rerouting of global supply chains, and resulting inefficiencies may continue to inflate prices while creating opportunities to straddle decoupled economies. As the U.S. and China move to reduce their interdependence, countries in the Indo-Pacific are attractive substitute trade partners positioned to receive significant imports from China and send significant exports to the United States. Middle powers may realize economic benefits by filling the void created by U.S.-China trade tensions.

Any military conflict over Taiwan would likely produce catastrophic consequences for the global economy, so heightened tensions surrounding the island create significant political and economic risk. Even if military confrontation between China and Taiwan can be avoided, the dynamic nature of the region’s economic partnerships makes for an unstable business environment. At the same time, the rise of industrial policy creates new streams of funding in industries deemed essential for security, advanced technology, and climate change mitigation. While the era of globalization rewarded firms for leveraging economies of scale, the era of friend-shoring and industrial policy may reward those that are positioned to compete for government subsidies and exploit international arbitrage opportunities.

For firms operating in the region, priorities include supply chain resilience, navigating complex regulations, and new business opportunities arising from industrial policies. Recognizing these stakes, companies such as Ford are diversifying investments away from China, securing lithium supply agreements with countries such as Australia and Canada. Tech companies like Microsoft and Apple are considering Indonesia as a potential manufacturing base. However, in a geopolitically charged world, companies are at risk of becoming “instruments of national power” and must keep abreast of evolving geopolitical risks.

Global stakes involve global public goods (GPG) in the areas of climate change adaptation, global health, natural resources, and environmental protection. GPGs are often sidelined during periods of great-power competition in favor of immediate national interests, disproportionately impacting populations that are vulnerable to GPG issues. However, multilateral dialogues on GPGs may provide opportunities to engage both the United States and China at the same time, potentially easing regional tensions and enabling limited progress on shared interests. Initial discussions between the U.S. and China on AI risks indicate possible cooperation, which could be applied to other critical global issues. With so much at stake, regional stability requires proactive cooperation on shared challenges and establishing guardrails where competition is inevitable. Collective hedging against a catastrophic conflict is the best bet for long-term peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

By Angeli Juani (Senior Policy and Quantitative Analyst), Andrew Doris (Senior Policy and Research Analyst), and Muhamed Sulejmanagic (Graduate Research Assistant), with direction from Dr. Mayesha Alam (Vice President of Research). Art direction and design by Sara Stewart, illustration by Andrei Cojocaru.

References

+

2023 Investment Climate Statements: Vietnam. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/vietnam/

Akiba, T. (2024, April 7). Ahead of state visit, an ‘epic’ shift in Japan’s defense posture. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/07/japan-kishida-china-ukraine-akiba/

As ‘Intense Frustration and Disillusionment’ Brew amid Raging Global Conflict, Economic Uncertainty, Revitalizing General Assembly is Increasingly Critical, President Says. (2023, November 10). United Nations. https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12560.doc.htm

Australia—US Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact. (2023, December 8). IEA. https://www.iea.org/policies/17901-australia-us-climate-critical-minerals-and-clean-energy-transformation-compact

Belt and Road Initiative: A Road of Green Development for the New Era. (2023, October 24). http://ws.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202310/t20231024_11166803.htm

Bhardwaj, N. (2023, September 8). Boosting India-ASEAN Economic Collaboration. ASEAN Business News. https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/boosting-india-asean-economic-collaboration-key-highlights-from-pm-modis-12-point-proposal/

Bilateral trade between China, Vietnam hits monthly record high. (2023, December 13). http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2023-12/13/content_116876643.htm

Bindman, P. (2023, August 21). China doubles down on overseas investment in critical minerals. Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/sectors/industry/weekly-data-china-seeks-to-extend-its-critical-minerals-dominance-with-overseas-investment-surge/

Blois, M. (2023, May 24). Ford strikes major lithium supply agreements. Chemical & Engineering News. https://cen.acs.org/energy/energy-storage-/Ford-strikes-major-lithium-supply/101/i17

Bowen, J. (2022, June 23). Enhancing Clean Energy Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. https://www.nbr.org/publication/enhancing-clean-energy-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. (2024, February 29). GAC. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng

Chiang, S. (2024, April 4). Malaysia emerges as a hotspot for semiconductor firms amid U.S.-China chip tensions. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/04/04/malaysia-emerges-as-a-hotspot-for-chip-firms-amid-us-china-tech-war.html

Chin, M. (2021, December). What Are Global Public Goods? IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2021/12/Global-Public-Goods-Chin-basics

China aims to clinch more free trade agreements, vowing increased openness. (2024, January 30). The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/in-depth/2024-01/30/content_116974761.htm

China FTA Network. (n.d.). Retrieved July 1, 2024, from http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml

Chinese Ambassador to Malaysia Ouyang Yujing Pens an Article Titled “Harmonising the Melody of China-Malaysia Friendship and Jointly Composing the New Chapter of Shared Future.” (2023, December 29). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202401/t20240103_11216256.html

Chivvis, C., & Geaghan-Breiner, B. (2024, April 9). Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/emerging-powers-and-the-future-of-american-statecraft?lang=en

Chowdhury, S. (2023, May 11). Economic Connectivity and Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/economic-connectivity-and-cooperation-in-the-bay-of-bengal/

Clark, J. (2023, September 12). Super Garuda Shield: U.S., Partners Train in Indo-Pacific. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3523152/super-garuda-shield-us-partners-train-in-indo-pacific/

Cohen, P. (2024, April 2). Poor Nations Are Writing a New Handbook for Getting Rich. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/02/business/economy/global-economic-growth.html

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). (n.d.). Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership

Country & Product Complexity Rankings. (n.d.). Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings

Dent, T. (2023, November 21). The Strait of Malacca’s Global Supply Chain Implications. https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/news-publications/inside-supply-management-magazine/blog/2023/2023-11/the-strait-of-malaccas-global-supply-chain-implications/

Economic Report of the President (p. 487). (2024). Council of Economic Advisors. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ERP-2024.pdf

Economy, E. (2024, April 23). China’s Alternative Order. Foreign Affairs, 103(3). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-alternative-order-xi-jinping-elizabeth-economy?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=%20China%E2%80%99s%20Alternative%20Order&utm_content=20240423&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia in Washington D.C. The United States of America. (n.d.). Kementerian Luar Negeri Repulik Indonesia. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://kemlu.go.id/washington/en

Eun-jung, K. (2024, June 3). NSC decides to suspend 2018 inter-Korean tension reduction pact following N.K. trash-carrying balloon campaign. Yonhap News Agency. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240603003551315

Evenett, S., Jakubik, A., Martin, F., & Ruta, M. (2024, January 4). The Return of Industrial Policy in Data. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/12/23/The-Return-of-Industrial-Policy-in-Data-542828

FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China. (2022, August 9). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/

FACT SHEET: President Joseph R. Biden and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong Announce the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. (2023, September 10). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/

Fatunde, M. (2024, January 5). The race to produce rare earth elements. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/01/05/1084791/rare-earth-materials-clean-energy/

Feingold, S. (2024, May 13). Geopolitical rivalries are costly for global businesses. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/05/business-geopolitics-rivalries-private-sector-geoeconomis/

Fifield, A. (2023, April 8). In latest test, North Korea detonates its most powerful nuclear device yet. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-apparently-conducts-another-nuclear-test-south-korea-says/2017/09/03/7bce3ff6-905b-11e7-8df5-c2e5cf46c1e2_story.html

Fildes, N. (2024, July 1). Australia increases defence spending by $32bn in response to China build-up. https://www.ft.com/content/a5ba1e78-92e7-4cd5-9bad-327e4358b1b4

Free Trade Agreements. (n.d.). United States Trade Representative. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements

Freund, C., Mattoo, A., Mulabdic, A., & Ruta, M. (2023, August 31). US-China decoupling: Rhetoric and reality. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/us-china-decoupling-rhetoric-and-reality

Gopinath, G., Gournichas, P.-O., Presbitero, A. F., & Topalova, P. (2024, April 5). Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War? IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-Cold-War-547357

Gordon, N., & McBride, M. (2024, May 16). The New U.S. Clean Tech Tariffs Will Have Global Impacts. Emissary. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/05/ev-battery-china-tariffs-biden-global-impact?lang=en

Gramer, R. (2024, July 2). Biden’s ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ Foreign-Policy Doctrine. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/11/biden-minilateralism-foreign-policy-doctrine-japan-philippines-aukus-quad/

Grossman, D. (2022). Indonesia Is Looking for More Than Security Support from the United States. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/09/indonesia-is-looking-for-more-than-security-support.html

Grossman, D. (2023). With ASEAN Paralyzed, Southeast Asia Seeks New Security Ties. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/09/with-asean-paralyzed-southeast-asia-seeks-new-security.html

Grossman, D. (2024a, July 2). New Zealand Becomes the Latest Country to Pivot to the U.S. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/23/new-zealand-us-china-alliances-nato-aukus/

Grossman, D. (2024b, July 2). The Philippines Is America’s New Star Ally in Asia. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/philippines-marcos-bongbong-china-japan-us-alliance-indo-pacific-geopolitics/

Guarascio, F. (2023, December 18). US sees no impact on Vietnam ties from Hanoi-Beijing defence pledges. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-sees-no-impact-vietnam-ties-hanoi-beijing-defence-pledges-2023-12-18/

Gupta, T., Raha, S., Sawant, K., & Pornet, A. (2022, November 29). Accelerating the Indo-Pacific Energy Transition. CEEW. https://www.ceew.in/publications/accelerating-clean-energy-transition-of-six-indo-pacific-countries

Hainan Drinda New Energy enters Vietnam with $450 million solar project. (2024, April 8). Vietnam Investment Review. https://vir.com.vn/hainan-drinda-new-energy-enters-vietnam-with-450-million-solar-project-110187.html

Harding, B., & Ober, K. (2024, March 21). Indonesia’s Nickel Bounty Sows Discord, Enables Chinese Control. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/indonesias-nickel-bounty-sows-discord-enables-chinese-control

Harold, S. W., Grossman, D., Harding, B., Hornung, J. W., Poling, G., Smith, J., & Smith, M. L. (2019). The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html

Hendrix, C. S. (2023, April 26). Indonesia wants to sell nickel to the US, but first it should scrap its export bans. PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/indonesia-wants-sell-nickel-us-first-it-should-scrap-its-export-bans

House, T. W. (2023, September 6). FACT SHEET: U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, One Year On. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/05/fact-sheet-u-s-asean-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-one-year-on/

How China Changed Under Xi Jinping, Explained in 12 Charts. (2024, March 11). Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-11/xi-s-biggest-wins-and-losses-after-more-than-a-decade-in-power

How Xi Jinping plans to overtake America. (2024, March 31). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/03/31/how-xi-jinping-plans-to-overtake-america

Huang, D. W. F., & Wu, W.-C. (2023). Taking Sides with the US Against China?—An Analysis of the Taiwanese Choice. In S. A. Grano & D. W. F. Huang (Eds.), China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices (pp. 275–305). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15389-1_11

Hunnicutt, T., & Scheyder, E. (2023, November 12). Exclusive: US, Indonesia to discuss potential for deal on EV minerals. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-indonesia-discuss-potential-deal-ev-minerals-sources-2023-11-12/

India, South Korea to expand cooperation in new technologies, semiconductors. (2024, March 6). Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-south-korea-to-expand-cooperation-in-new-technologies-semiconductors-101709735184913.html

India-China dispute: The border row explained in 400 words. (2022, December 13). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484

Indonesia Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). (n.d.). UNDP. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.undp.org/indonesia/projects/indonesia-just-energy-transition-partnership-jetp

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). (n.d.). United States Trade Representative. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity-ipef

Issues, I. for U. S.-C. D. on G. (2023, November 22). A Look at China’s Overseas Security Partnerships. Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues. https://uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/podcasts/a-look-at-china-s-overseas-security-partnerships

Japan Trade Agreement. (2023, January 12). U.S. Customs and Border Protection. https://www.cbp.gov/trade/free-trade-agreements/japan

Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement. (2022, January 6). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page4e_001195.html

Jiao, C. (2023, September 5). China’s Largest Export Market is Now Much Closer to Home. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-05/china-s-largest-export-market-is-now-much-closer-to-home

Joint Leaders’ Statement: Elevating United States-Vietnam Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. (2023, September 11). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/11/joint-leaders-statement-elevating-united-states-vietnam-relations-to-a-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/

Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS. (2021, September 16). Prime Minister of Australia. https://web.archive.org/web/20210927191438/https:/www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-leaders-statement-aukus

Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. (2024, April 11). U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3739122/joint-press-statement-for-the-24th-korea-us-integrated-defense-dialogue/

Kavanagh, J. (2023, February 8). Japan’s New Defense Budget Is Still Not Enough. Commentary. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/02/japans-new-defense-budget-is-still-not-enough?lang=en

Kim, F. (2023, November 15). Philippines, South Korea enhancing defense cooperation. Indo-Pacific Defense Forum. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2023/11/philippines-south-korea-enhancing-defense-cooperation/

Kim, V. (2020, November 19). When China and U.S. spar, it’s South Korea that gets punched. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-19/south-korea-china-beijing-economy-thaad-missile-interceptor

Kine, P., Ward, A., & Seligman, L. (2024, March 29). US, Japan, Philippines plan joint South China Sea naval patrols. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/29/us-japan-philippines-plan-joint-south-china-sea-naval-patrols-00149797

Kramer, K. (2022, December 7). Just Energy Transition Partnerships: An opportunity to leapfrog from coal to clean energy. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/articles/insight/just-energy-transition-partnerships

Lu, M. (2024, April 26). All of the Grants Given by the U.S. CHIPS Act. Visual Capitalist. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-grants-given-by-the-u-s-chips-act/

Luong, D. (2024, January 9). Will Vietnam Get Caught in the Crosshairs of Great-Power Politics Again? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/09/vietnam-us-china-japan-great-power-politics-diplomatic-ties-strategic-partnership/

Ly, J. (2024, May 14). China and US envoys will hold the first top-level dialogue on artificial intelligence in Geneva. Center for Security and Emerging Technology. https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/china-and-us-envoys-will-hold-the-first-top-level-dialogue-on-artificial-intelligence-in-geneva/

Maduz, L. (2023). Explaining Korea’s Positioning in the US–China Strategic Competition. In S. A. Grano & D. W. F. Huang (Eds.), China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices (pp. 247–273). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15389-1_10

Manca, G. (2023, October 4). Beyond Rhetoric: The Tangible Impact of China-US Decoupling. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/beyond-rhetoric-the-tangible-impact-of-china-us-decoupling/

Mandhana, N. (2024, April 29). The Dark-Horse Alliance Racing Forward to Take On China. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/the-dark-horse-alliance-racing-forward-to-take-on-china-b4949625

Martin, T. W. (2023, June 21). U.S. Antimissile System in South Korea, a Source of Chinese Anger, Cleared for Full Deployment. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-antimissile-system-in-south-korea-a-source-of-chinese-anger-cleared-for-full-deployment-8141b4dc

McGuirk, R. (2024, February 29). Philippine president tells Australia their strategic partnership is more important than ever. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/marcos-australia-philippines-parliament-china-fb8ccc6b13813c5d7b24422f902d9310

Minerals Security Partnership. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/

Nagatomi, S. (2024, April 27). Japan’s defense spending climbs to 1.6% of GDP. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-s-defense-spending-climbs-to-1.6-of-GDP

Net zero targets. (n.d.). Climate Action Tracker. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/vietnam/net-zero-targets/

Ng, K. (2024, March 26). Japan to sell fighter jets in latest break from post-war pacifist ideals. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68662465

Nguyen, H. (2024, January 5). Vietnam’s “Bamboo” Diplomacy Hailed for Balancing Between US, China. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-s-bamboo-diplomacy-hailed-for-balancing-between-us-china/7428459.html

Nolan, B. (2024, May 2). First Tim Cook, now Satya Nadella is also wooing Indonesia—The world’s 4th most populous nation. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/indonesia-satya-nadella-microsoft-apple-tim-cook-cloud-computing-manufacturing-2024-5

North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present. (2023, April 24). Missile Threat. https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/

Overly, S. (2023, June 2). More countries line up for U.S.’s EV tax credits. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/02/southeast-asian-trade-partners-push-for-ev-tax-perks-00099800

Palmer, J. (2024, July 2). China-Philippines Tensions Heat Up. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/02/china-philippines-tension-dispute-coast-guard-spratly-islands/

Parameswaran, P. (2019, July). Managing the Rise of China’s Security Partnerships in Southeast Asia. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/managing-the-rise-chinas-security-partnerships-southeast-asia

Parsons, C. (2022, May 23). The Pacific Islands: The front line in the battle against climate change. National Science Foundation. https://new.nsf.gov/science-matters/pacific-islands-front-line-battle-against-climate

Pekcetin, A. S. (2023, October 27). Japan-Philippines Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies. https://www.ankasam.org/japan-philippines-security-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/?lang=en

Philippines Energy Transition Strategies. (2024, April 25). International Trade Administration. https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/philippines-energy-transition-strategies

Philippines’ Marcos says maritime cooperation a cornerstone in Vietnam visit. (2024, January 29). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-says-maritime-cooperation-cornerstones-vietnam-visit-2024-01-29/

Philippines seeks more sites for critical minerals in govt-led exploration. (2023, September 19). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/currencies/philippines-seeks-more-sites-for-critical-minerals-in-govt-led-exploration-idUSKBN30P0C8/

Pohlkamp, E.-K. (2023, October 26). What Europe can learn from Japan’s approach to the global south. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/article/what-europe-can-learn-from-japans-approach-to-the-global-south/

Potential US-Indonesia critical minerals agreement prompts backlash over Indonesia’s poor environmental and human rights record. (2023, October 30). AFTINET. https://aftinet.org.au/aftinet.org.au/cms/latest-news/US-Indonesia-critical-mineral-deal-prompts-backlash

Pretat, H., Sato, M., Mallory, T., & Poling, G. (2023, December 18). Deep Blue Scars: Environmental Threats to the South China Sea. https://features.csis.org/environmental-threats-to-the-south-china-sea

Protectionism Is Failing to Achieve Its Goals and Threatens the Future of Critical Industries. (2023, August 29). World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/08/29/protectionism-is-failing-to-achieve-its-goals-and-threatens-the-future-of-critical-industries

PwC Net Zero Economy Index: Asia Pacific’s Transition. (n.d.). PwC. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/esg/esg-asia-pacific/net-zero-economy-index-asia-pacifics-transition.html

Rajagopalan, R. P. (2021, September 16). Explaining the Rise of Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/explaining-the-rise-of-minilaterals-in-the-indo-pacific

Rajagopalan, R. P. (2023, January 14). Beyond the Quad: Booming Security Cooperation Efforts in the Indo-Pacific. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/beyond-the-quad-booming-security-cooperation-efforts-in-the-indo-pacific/

Regional Lab: Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and World Order. (2023, June 13). https://asia.fes.de/news/geopolitics-regional-lab-2

Savitri, C. M. (2023). Go East or North? Recalibrating Defence Modernization in a Post-Russia Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 45(2), 166–192.

Scott, M. (2024, January 9). A War Over Taiwan Is a $10 Trillion Risk. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-09/economy-risks-latest-taiwan-war-would-cost-world-10-trillion

Second India-Australia 2+2 Defence and Foreign Ministerial Dialogue. (2023, November 18). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37270/Second+IndiaAustralia+22+Defence+and+Foreign+Ministerial+Dialogue+November+20+2023

Sevastopulo, D., & Inagaki, K. (2024, March 24). US and Japan plan biggest upgrade to security pact in over 60 years. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/df99994d-ec4b-4c3c-9c42-738ec9b338d0

Shofa, J. N. (n.d.). IPEF Should Open Up Access for Critical Minerals: Jokowi Tells Harris. Jakarta Globe. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://jakartaglobe.id/business/ipef-should-open-up-access-for-critical-minerals-jokowi-tells-harris

Signing of Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement. (2023, January 11). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/gb/page1e_000556.html

Solomon, F. (2024, March 6). How China’s Aggressive Sea Tactics Look From the Deck of an Opposing Ship. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/how-chinas-aggressive-sea-tactics-look-from-the-deck-of-an-opposing-ship-a942f912

South Korea urges better cooperation on supply chain with China. (2024, May 16). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/south-korea-urges-better-cooperation-supply-chain-with-china-2024-05-16/

Stone, J. (2023, November 29). Indonesia Exploits US-China Divide on Critical Minerals. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-exploits-us-china-divide-on-critical-minerals-/7377701.html

Strangio, S. (2021, April 8). Japan Could Deliver 8 Cutting-Edge Frigates to Indonesia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/japan-could-deliver-8-cutting-edge-frigates-to-indonesia/

Suominen, K. (2021). The CPTPP’s Impacts on Digital Trade and the Path Forward. https://www.csis.org/analysis/cptpps-impacts-digital-trade-and-path-forward

Suroyo, G., & Sulaiman, S. (2023, October 16). Indonesia to seek China’s help to develop renewables at Belt and Road Forum. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/indonesia-seek-chinas-help-develop-renewables-belt-road-forum-2023-10-16/

Talavera, C. (n.d.). Foreign investors keen on mineral processing – DTI. Philstar. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.philstar.com/business/2023/09/21/2297751/foreign-investors-keen-mineral-processing-dti

Tellis, A. (2023, November 9). Interdependence Imperiled? Economic Decoupling in an Era of Strategic Competition. The National Bureau of Asian Research. https://www.nbr.org/publication/interdependence-imperiled-economic-decoupling-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition/

Territorial Claims, Maps. (n.d.). The South China Sea. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.southchinasea.org/maps/territorial-claims-maps/

Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. (n.d.). Global Conflict Tracker. Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

The Death of the WTO Now Looks Inevitable. (2024, March 8). Bloomberg.Com. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-03-08/world-trade-organization-s-death-is-a-momentous-error

The pivot to renewable energy in Vietnam. (2023, October 2). McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/putting-renewable-energy-within-reach-vietnams-high-stakes-pivot

The State of Southeast Asia 2023: Survey Report (p. 60). (2023). ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-State-of-SEA-2023-Final-Digital-V4-09-Feb-2023.pdf

The State of Southeast Asia 2024: Survey Report (p. 76). (2024). ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-State-of-SEA-2024.pdf

The vanguard of the Global South—Editorial. (2023, September 23). The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/09/23/the-vanguard-of-the-global-south.html

Tokyo in talks with Manila over sending troops to the Philippines. (n.d.). Retrieved July 1, 2024, from https://www.ft.com/content/2bf4cb90-bc86-4db2-a0d5-21973f7b2765

Torode, G., & Lema, K. (2024, February 26). Exclusive: Satellite images reveal floating barrier at mouth of disputed atoll in South China Sea. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/satellite-images-reveal-floating-barrier-mouth-disputed-atoll-south-china-sea-2024-02-26/

Tossini, J. V. (2020, April 14). The Five Eyes—The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/

Tower, J., & Glaser, B. S. (2024, March 5). Mapping China’s Influence in Myanmar’s Crisis | German Marshall Fund of the United States. German Marshall Fund of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/mapping-chinas-influence-myanmars-crisis

Toyoda, Y., Kubo, N., & Morales, N. J. (2023, February 8). Philippines’ Marcos visits Japan seeking closer security ties. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-visits-japan-seeking-closer-security-ties-2023-02-08/

Tritto, A. (2023, April 11). How Indonesia Used Chinese Industrial Investments to Turn Nickel into the New Gold. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/04/how-indonesia-used-chinese-industrial-investments-to-turn-nickel-into-the-new-gold?lang=en

United States and Japan Sign Critical Minerals Agreement. (2023, March 28). United States Trade Representative. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/march/united-states-and-japan-sign-critical-minerals-agreement

US, Britain, Australia weigh expanding AUKUS security pact to deter China, FT says. (2024, April 7). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/aukus-weighs-expanding-security-pact-deter-china-ft-says-2024-04-07/

US Businesses Plan $8 Billion Investment in Vietnam. (2024, January 30). Voice of America. https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/us-businesses-plan-8-billion-investment-in-vietnam/7458896.html

US eyes Philippine ties in energy and critical minerals. (2024, March 26). BusinessWorld Online. https://www.bworldonline.com/the-nation/2024/03/26/584343/us-eyes-philippine-ties-in-energy-and-critical-minerals/

US Opens Way For Nuclear Investment In Energy-hungry Philippines. (2023, November 16). Barron’s. https://www.barrons.com/news/us-opens-way-for-nuclear-investment-in-energy-hungry-philippines-c54f9a2a

Vietnam expects strong wave of Chinese investment. (2023, December 18). Vietnam+. https://en.vietnamplus.vn/post-275035.vnp

What Is ASEAN? (2023, September 18). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean

Wooldrige, A. (2024, March 20). CEOs Rarely Win in the Game of Geopolitics. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-03-20/ceos-rarely-win-in-the-game-of-geopolitics

Yen, H. (2023, July 20). Vietnam needs US$135 billion for energy infrastructure until 2030. Hanoi Times. https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-needs-us135-billion-for-energy-infrastructure-until-2030-324266.html

Zhou, W. (2015, November 5). China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Elcano Royal Institute. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/chinas-growing-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/

This Power Map was produced by FP Analytics, the independent research division of The FP Group. Foreign Policy’s editorial team was not involved in the creation of this content.